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Six experiments found that manipulations that increase thought speed also yield positive affect. These
experiments varied in both the methods used for accelerating thought (i.e., instructions to brainstorm
freely, exposure to multiple ideas, encouragement to plagiarize others’ ideas, performance of easy
cognitive tasks, narration of a silent video in fast-forward, and experimentally controlled reading speed)
and the contents of the thoughts that were induced (from thoughts about money-making schemes to
thoughts of five-letter words). The results suggested that effects of thought speed on mood are partially
rooted in the subjective experience of thought speed. The results also suggested that these effects can be
attributed to the joy-enhancing effects of fast thinking (rather than only to the joy-killing effects of slow
thinking). This work is inspired by observations of a link between “racing thoughts” and euphoria in
cases of clinical mania, and potential implications of that observed link are discussed.
Keywords: thought speed, mood, metacognition, mania, manic thinking
We all have had experiences where we feel as though our minds
are racing, or at least moving faster than usual. We might take
advantage of this surge in mental activity to begin writing a book
or developing a new theory. Alternatively, we might simply call a
friend and chatter on endlessly about our day, or lie awake at night
until we write down whatever is rushing through our heads. The
opposite of such experiences also is common. Many of us have had
moments of feeling as though our thoughts have ground to a halt,
or at least are moving slower than usual. These experiences sug-
gest that, in everyday life, we sometimes experience differences in
the speed of our thoughts. In the present research, we examine the
affective experience produced by commonplace situations that
influence thought speed.
Links Between Thought Speed and Mood
Variations in thought speed have been observed across a number
of contexts, and the relevant findings often suggest that those
variations are associated with differences in mood. For example, in
the psychiatric literature, the elated mood of mania is often ac-
companied by “racing thoughts” and the dysphoric mood of de-
pression is often accompanied by slowed thinking (Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). The effects of stimulant drug intake also
suggest a relationship between thought speed and mood. Amphet-
amines, as well as the more pedestrian drug caffeine, have been
shown not only to accelerate the pace of thinking on measures of
cognitive processing speed, but also to elevate positive mood (e.g.,
Asghar et al., 2003; Smit & Rogers, 2000). Even near-death
experiences have been described as involving unusually rapid
thinking as well as an odd sense of euphoria (Noyes & Kletti,
1976, 1977).
More mundane experiences also appear to affect both mood and
thought speed, though their effects are less powerful than those
produced by having a mental illness, ingesting amphetamines, or
having a near-death experience. For example, listening to fast
music is thought to induce faster mental processing than listening
to slow music, and listening to fast music also can elevate positive
mood while listening to slow music can deflate it (e.g., Clark,
1983; Husain, Thompson, & Schellenberg, 2002). In addition,
brainstorming sessions, in which individuals freely toss their ideas
into a group discussion, have been shown to elicit not only rapid
idea generation but also feelings of enjoyment (e.g., Nijstad &
Stroebe, 2006). Some research even suggests that bouts of vigor-
ous physical exercise can serve both to quicken people’s thought
and to improve their mood (e.g., Brisswalter, Collardeau, & Rene,
2002; Hansen, Stevens, & Coast, 2001; Lichtman & Poser, 1983).
Although the above research findings suggest a link between
thought speed and mood, thought speed has been largely neglected
as a variable in experimental research. Some previous research has
looked at related ideas, for example demonstrating the conse-
quences of positive mood for cognitive processes related to
thought speed. Specifically, positive mood can engender broad
rather than detailed thinking, loose and creative associations, reli-
ance on cognitive short-cuts or heuristics, and more efficient
cognitive processing (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2001; Gasper &
Clore, 2002; Isen, 2000). Some evidence suggests that the causal
link may also go the other way. For example, research has shown
that manipulations that increase perceptual fluency (e.g., repeated
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597exposure to a stimulus), and thereby boost the speed of mental
processing, also induce positive feelings toward the fluent stimulus
and elicit a general “warm glow” of positive affect (e.g., Harmon-
Jones & Allen, 2001; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004;
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). In terms of
more high-level thinking, Evdokas (1997) reported an intriguing
result in his doctoral dissertation: inducing people to generate
many rather than few responses to a Rorschach inkblot test (in a
constrained time period) led them to feel more positive affect.
Finally, one experiment led participants to read thought content
that was either elating or depressing (see Velten, 1968) at either a
fast or slow speed. The result was that people felt more positive
mood after reading fast than slow, regardless of the mood content
of what they had read (Pronin & Wegner, 2006).
Theoretical Rationale
Although the evidence for a causal link between thought speed
and mood is not well explored (a fact that this article aims to
partially rectify), there are a number of theoretical reasons to
expect such a causal relationship. We now turn to a discussion of
the theoretical motivation for our prediction.
People often reflect on their own cognitive activities, and such
metacognitive experiences have been shown to influence self-
assessments and mood by virtue of people’s lay theories about the
meaning of those experiences (e.g., Petty, Brinol, Tormala, &
Wegener, 2007; Schwarz, 2005). For example, if people have a lay
theory that “the easier it is for me to generate examples of my
flaws, the more flaws I have,” then they are likely to feel more
flawed the more easily examples of flaws come to mind (Schwarz
& Clore, 2007). Pronin and Jacobs (2007) found evidence sug-
gesting that people possess a lay theory that fast thinking is a sign
of a good mood. Participants read about a student whose thoughts
were described as either “moving at an unusually fast pace” (while
daydreaming, or problem-solving, depending on version), or
“moving at a pace that isn’t especially fast or slow.” Participants
who read about the student whose thoughts were faster reported
that the student would experience significantly more positive af-
fect than those who read about the student whose thoughts were
slower (this was true regardless of whether the student was de-
scribed as daydreaming or problem-solving). This finding, along
with work on metacognitive experiences more generally, suggests
that people’s experience of thinking fast could boost their positive
affect by virtue of their inferences about the meaning of that
thought speed.
Research on brain neurochemistry provides further theoretical
motivation for our prediction. Specifically, theorizing about the
causes and effects of activating the dopaminergic system is rele-
vant. Research has not aimed to directly study dopaminergic
system effects of thought speed, but some studies suggest that
phasic activation of dopamine neurons occurs in response to ex-
posure to stimuli that are novel, intense, or rewarding (Berridge &
Robinson, 2003; Horvitz, 2002; Schultz, 2001). Thought speed
may increase dopaminergic activity if that speed involves exposure
to varying (novel) thought stimuli at a rapid (intense) rate. Because
dopaminergic activity is associated with experiences of reward and
pleasure (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000), activation of it in
response to rapid novel thoughts could offer a boost to positive
mood. Consistent with this theorizing, it is perhaps worth noting
that drugs that increase dopaminergic activity (e.g., cocaine) are
generally both affectively rewarding and thought-speed enhancing
(e.g., Asghar et al., 2003; Cocores, Patel, Gold, & Pottash, 1987).
Research on processing fluency provides another theoretical
motivation for our prediction. That research has shown that the
ease of mental processing elicits heightened positive affect (see
Winkielman et al., 2003, for a review). This may be because
processing ease is taken as a signal of the perceiver’s general
success in perceiving the relevant stimulus or as a sign of the
familiarity (and safety) of that stimulus (e.g., Jacoby & Brooks,
1984; Masson & MacLeod, 1997; Winkielman et al., 2003). Object
features that facilitate processing ease (or fluency) include figure-
ground contrast, exposure duration, and stimulus repetition. Flu-
ency is also associated with more rapid mental processing speed,
such that stimulus features that enhance fluency (e.g., greater
figure-ground contrast) also enhance processing speed. Indeed,
past research involving both self-report and psychophysiological
measures suggests that faster processing elicits more positive
emotion even when the fact of that increased processing speed is
not available via conscious reflection, as when it is elicited by
repeated exposure to subliminal stimuli (e.g., Harmon-Jones &
Allen, 2001; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000). When fluency
effects occur without mediation by conscious experience, “objec-
tive fluency” (e.g., the actual speed and ease of mental processing)
alone has an impact. Fluency effects also can result from “subjec-
tive fluency” (e.g., the perceived speed and ease of mental pro-
cessing), when those effects involve the sort of metacognitive
experiences (and lay theories) described above (Skurnik, Schwarz,
& Winkielman, 2000; Winkielman et al., 2003).
Taken together, these theoretical approaches give us additional
reason, beyond that provided by our initial review of empirical
findings, for predicting a causal effect of thought speed on mood.
In the present article, our primary aim is to provide experimental
tests of a causal relationship between thought speed and positive
affect. In so doing, we also explore the possible mediating role of
participants’ metacognitive experience of their thought speed by
asking them to report on their perceptions of that speed. Such
mediation would not necessarily mean that the metacognitive
experience of fast thinking is required for fast thinking to elicit
positive affect, but a lack of such mediation would be inconsistent
with the possible role of metacognition.
The Present Research
In the present experiments, we manipulated thought speed and
measured its effects on positive mood. Our research began with an
experiment that sought to elicit fast thinking in a relatively uncon-
strained way: participants were instructed to freely brainstorm
about a problem, or they were assigned to a comparison condition
in which they were asked to be more selective in their generation
of ideas about that problem. Experiments 2 and 3 introduced
variations on this procedure, for example involving fast versus
slow exposure to pregenerated ideas about the problem (Experi-
ment 2). Experiment 4 used a different paradigm, in which partic-
ipants generated answers to word problems that varied in terms of
how rapidly they could be solved. Experiment 5 introduced fast,
normal, and slow speed conditions to ensure that the hypothesized
effect could be attributable to fast thinking increasing positive
mood (as opposed to only slow thinking decreasing it). Finally,
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participants’ mood before versus after a fast or slow thought-speed
manipulation. In each experiment, we tested whether participants’
subjective (or metacognitive) experience of their thought speed
would at least partially mediate the effect of our experimental
manipulation. Thus, each of our experiments tested the general
hypothesis that thinking fast rather than slow would increase
positive mood (and that the effect would be at least in part
attributable to the conscious feeling of thinking fast). We also
aimed, in these experiments, to rule out the possibility that the
predicted thought-speed effects would be merely an artifact of
participants performing better (or feeling that they were perform-
ing better) under conditions of fast thinking. Finally, because our
hypothesis was in part inspired by the most well-known case in
which increased thought speed and positive mood co-occur—that
is, clinical mania—we also explored two other well-known re-
sponses that occur during that experience (i.e., inflated self-esteem
or “grandiosity,” and difficulty being interrupted or “pressured
speech”). In so doing, we aimed to discover whether some com-
mon sequelae of clinical mania, although dramatically reduced
from their pathological forms, might result from modest situational
manipulations of thought speed.
Experiment 1: Unrestrained Brainstorming
This study sought to engender thought acceleration in experi-
mental participants and to see whether such thinking would induce
positive mood. Participants were instructed to generate solutions to
a novel problem. Those in the fast condition were encouraged to
generate every idea that they could think of, while those in the
slow condition were encouraged to generate viable ideas only. We
predicted that participants in the fast condition would report think-
ing faster than their peers and would also display more positive
mood.
Method
Participants
A total of 79 undergraduates (44 female and 35 male) partici-
pated individually in exchange for course credit.
Procedure and Experimental Manipulation
After consenting to participate in a study about “generating
ideas,” participants were furnished with a sheet of lined paper and
a pen. They were told that we wanted them to “think about ways
to make 1-year’s college tuition in a summer.” They were in-
structed to imagine that they were “faced with this challenge for
the upcoming summer.” They were told that they would have 10
minutes to think about the problem, and they were asked to write
down their ideas. Before leaving participants to their task, the
experimenter delivered a final instruction, constituting the exper-
imental manipulation. To those in the fast condition (i.e., the
condition designed to induce fast thinking), she said:
Come up with any and every idea that you possibly can. As soon as
you have an idea, write it down. Don’t worry about whether the ideas
are good or not at this stage. Just let your mind race and run free with
this problem.
To those in the slow condition, She said:
Come up with as many good ideas as you can. As soon as you have
an idea, take the time to evaluate whether or not it is a good idea.
Write down only good ideas. Just use your mind to carefully think
through this problem.
After 10 minutes, the experimenter returned with a question-
naire packet. After participants completed it, they were asked to
look back at the list of ideas they had written and to draw a star
next to each idea that they thought was a “good idea.”
Measures
Positive affect. Participants completed the positive affect scale
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This scale asks participants to report
how much they currently are feeling various positive emotions:
that is, excited, enthusiastic, attentive, interested, alert, active,
strong, determined, inspired, proud (1  very slightly,5 ex-
tremely; Cronbach’s alpha  .87). To determine whether specific
subcomponents of the positive feeling state were present while
others were absent, or whether the state was more diffusely posi-
tive, we augmented this scale with a number of additional items
(i.e., happy, creative, powerful, tired [reverse-scored], insightful),
thus creating our measure of positive affect (Cronbach’s alpha 
.90). The inclusion of these items allowed us to examine four
subcomponents of positive affect: elation (excited, enthusiastic,
happy; .77); heightened energy (alert, tired [reverse-scored],
attentive, active; .68); feelings of creativity (creative, insight-
ful, inspired; .75); feelings of power (strong, powerful, deter-
mined; .73).
Felt thought speed. Participants indicated their subjectively
experienced thought speed, by answering the question: “Some-
times people have the feeling that their thoughts are coming
slowly, and other times people feel that their thoughts are ‘racing.’
What did you feel was the speed of your thoughts, as you thought
about the problem?” (1  very slow,9 very fast).
Inflated self-esteem/grandiosity. As a measure of inflated self-
esteem (or “grandiosity”), participants completed the State Self-
Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), consisting of 20 state-
ments dealing with ongoing feelings of self-esteem. The scale
includes subscales for performance esteem (e.g., “I feel confident
about my abilities”), appearance esteem (e.g., “I am pleased with
my appearance right now”), and social esteem (e.g., “I am worried
about what other people think of me”), with all items anchored at
1( not at all)a n d5( extremely). As another potential measure of
grandiosity, participants completed the Behavior Identification
Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which probes for peo-
ple’s tendency to identify their behaviors at a high level (i.e., one
that attaches larger meaning to the behavior). Respondents choose
between two descriptions of a single behavior where one of the
descriptions is low-level and the other is high-level (e.g., reading
as either following lines of print,o rgaining knowledge). Scores are
based on the number of high-level alternatives chosen (out of
25 items).
Negative affect. As a measure of negative affect, participants
completed four items from the negative affect scale of the PANAS
(distressed,hostile,jittery,irritable; Cronbach’s alpha .73). We had
no predictions for this measure because our analysis of the literature
599 THOUGHT SPEED AND MOODsuggested that positive mood tends to increase with thought speed, but
did not contain examples of consistent differences in negative mood.
See Appendix for a summary of measures used in this study.
Results and Discussion
Positive Affect
Participants in the condition designed to induce fast thinking
reported more positive affect than did participants in the condition
designed to induce slow thinking (Ms  2.90 vs. 2.43, SDs  .65
and .73), F(1, 77)  9.20, p  .003. As can be seen in Table 1,
participants in the fast condition also scored higher on each of the
scale subcomponents—that is, elation, F(1, 77)  4.46, p  .04,
energy, F(1, 77)  10.42, p  .002, power, F(1, 77)  5.34, p 
.02, and creativity, F(1, 77)  7.61, p  .007.
The Role of Felt Thought Speed
We next examined whether participants’ subjective experience
of their thought speed mediated the relationship between experi-
mental condition and positive affect. Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, participants in the fast condition perceived themselves as
thinking faster than did those in the slow condition (Ms  5.88 vs.
4.49, SDs  1.40 and 1.93), F(1, 77)  13.70, p  .0004.
Moreover, we found that across conditions the faster participants
felt they were thinking, the more positive affect they felt, r(77) 
.33, p  .003. The Sobel test advocated by Baron and Kenny
(1986) revealed that the effect of experimental condition on pos-
itive affect diminished marginally when felt thought speed was
included in the model, z  1.84, p  .06. We also examined the
within-cell correlations between thought speed and mood, with a
particular interest in whether those who were not in the fast
condition would also report relatively more positive affect if they
thought relatively fast in that condition (for an explanation of this
“mediational” strategy, see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). The
correlations were: slow condition, r(37)  .32. p  .047, and fast
condition, r(39)  .33, p  .003.
The Role of Alternative Mechanisms
For purposes of comparison, we also tested an alternate medi-
ational model whereby our manipulation of experimental condition
might have led participants to feel positively by influencing their
actual (rather than felt) rate of thought production. First, we found
that participants in the fast condition did in fact list a larger number
of thoughts than their peers in the allotted 10 minutes (Ms  15.59
vs. 6.79, SDs  8.41 and 2.89), F(1, 77)  38.29, p  .0001.
Although the number of thoughts that participants generated in 10
minutes was correlated with their affect, r(77)  .22, p  .048, the
Sobel test revealed that this factor did not mediate the effect of
experimental condition on positive affect, z  .40, ns.
We next tested a third possible model, whereby participants may
have felt more positively because they had succeeded in generating
better quality ideas. To test this possibility, we first had two
research assistants rate the creativity of every idea generated by
every participant, as a function of the idea’s novelty and usefulness
(1  not at all creative,5 extremely creative; interrater reli-
ability coefficient .77). The ideas of participants in the fast
condition were rated as less creative than those of their peers
(Ms  2.37 vs. 2.64, SDs  .33 and .34), F(1, 74)  12.82, p 
.0006. This effect was not because of fast-condition participants
having generated so many ideas that their creativity petered out
toward the end; the same result emerged when only the first seven
ideas generated by each participant (i.e., the average number
generated by participants in the slow condition) were examined
(Ms  2.34 vs. 2.63, SDs  .41 and .34), F(1, 74)  11.97, p 
.0009. Moreover, the creativity of participants’ ideas (using either
standard) did not correlate with positive affect (rs  .15 and
.12, respectively, ps  .15).
Finally, because subjective feelings of success might be a better
candidate for mediation than objective success, we looked to test
a fourth alternative model whereby participants may have felt
more positively in the fast condition because they felt more suc-
cessful. In fact, participants in the fast condition saw their ideas as
being of worse quality than did those in the slow condition.
Specifically, those in the fast condition indicated that less than half
of their ideas were “good ideas,” whereas their peers reported that
more than half of their ideas were good (Ms  .44 vs. .57, SDs 
.19 and .27), F(1, 74)  5.98, p  .02. We also were able to
address this fourth model in a different way, by examining whether
the effect of condition on positive affect was mediated by partic-
ipants’ feelings of success, as measured by the performance sub-
scale of the State Self-Esteem Scale (sample items: “I feel frus-
trated or rattled about my performance”; “I feel like I’m not doing
well”). We found that experimental condition did not predict
scores on this measure, F(1, 78)  1.49, p  .23, thereby ruling
out any possible mediation (Sobel test z  1.02, ns.).
Additional Measures
Inflated self-esteem/grandiosity. Participants in the fast condi-
tion reported higher state self-esteem than their peers, F(1, 77) 
5.89, p  .02. Results on the BIF, however, did not significantly
differ, F(1, 77)  1.55, p  .22 (see Table 1).
Negative affect. Participants showed no differences between
the fast condition and the slow condition in negative affect (Ms 
1.55 vs. 1.62, SDs  .64 and .73), F(1, 77)  .17, ns.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Experiment 1
Speed of thought condition
Measure Slow Fast
Elation
M (SD) 2.52 (0.96) 2.96
 (0.90)
High Energy
M (SD) 2.46 (0.70) 2.99
 (0.76)
Feelings of Power
M (SD) 2.39 (0.96) 2.85
 (0.79)
Feelings of Creativity
M (SD) 2.38 (0.86) 2.89
 (0.82)
State Self-Esteem
M (SD) 3.34 (0.47) 3.59
 (0.46)
Behavior Identification Form (BIF)
M (SD) 13.30 (4.74) 14.58 (4.45)
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater expression of the relevant state.
All measures were on 5-point scales, except for the BIF (on which scores
represent the number of high-level responses out of 25).
 Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .05.
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The results of this study offer initial support for the hypothesis
that inducing people to think fast rather than slow leads them to
experience more positive affect. Moreover, these results provide a
tentative suggestion that the subjective experience or “feeling” of
fast thinking mediates its mood effects. The results provide an
initial suggestion that these effects are not mediated by perceptions
of idea quality or rate of idea production.
Because this experiment manipulated thought speed somewhat
indirectly—by virtue of brainstorming instructions—it is possible
that some other property of those instructions may have induced
the observed mood effect. For example, those instructions may
have led participants in the fast condition to generate different idea
content from their peers, and that difference may have led them to
feel more positively. Our raters did not find their ideas more
creative, but perhaps some other content-related difference oc-
curred. Our next study sought to address this concern by control-
ling not only the speed of participants’ thoughts, but also the
content of their thoughts.
Experiment 2: Exposure to Multiple Ideas
Rather than generating their own ideas for making money dur-
ing the summer, participants read ideas presented to them for the
putative purpose of aiding their own thought process. The ideas
were presented on a computer screen, at a speed that was either
designed to induce the experience of fast thinking or the experi-
ence of thinking at a slower speed.
Method
Participants
A total of 77 undergraduates (58 female and 19 male) partici-
pated individually in exchange for course credit.
Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants were told that we
wanted them to think about ways to make one year’s college
tuition in a summer. “To help you in doing this,” we told them,
“you will be exposed to a number of ideas generated by other
students.” Participants were assured that they would not be tested
on any of the ideas, and rather that the purpose of seeing them was
“to help aid your thinking process about this problem.” They were
informed that at the end of the experiment, they would be asked to
tell us their ideas.
Before being exposed to the ideas (see below), participants were
told that they should read aloud each idea as it appeared on their
computer monitor. After reading the ideas, they completed our
questionnaire packet. Finally, the experimenter gave them “30
seconds to tell me what you think you would do, if you were faced
with the problem of ways to make one year’s college tuition in a
summer.” She then turned on a tape recorder and instructed them
to begin. After 30 seconds, she interrupted them, saying:
“Okay—30 seconds.”
Thought Stimuli and Experimental Manipulation
The ideas that participants saw were drawn from those gener-
ated by participants in Experiment 1. Specifically, every idea
generated in that experiment was classified by its content into one
of seven categories (i.e., soliciting funds, running a business,
cultivating fame and fortune, working for hourly pay, using spe-
cialized skills, selling or renting things, and engaging in risky
ventures), and the nine most reasonable ideas from each category
were selected for use in this experiment (the ideas that were
excluded primarily involved suggestions that were patently absurd,
such as “hunt for a buried treasure”). In the fast condition, each of
the 63 resulting ideas was presented in a fixed random order, for
225 milliseconds per word (i.e., slightly faster than normal silent
reading speed, which is 250 milliseconds per word; Glass &
Holyoak, 1986). In the slow condition, each of seven ideas was
presented for nine times as long. To ensure that the two experi-
mental conditions were equal in duration, participants in the slow
condition were shown one-ninth of the ideas in the fast condition.
That is, they saw the strongest idea from each category (as judged
by three undergraduate raters). Thus, although the experimental
manipulation took the same length of time in both conditions,
participants were induced to process ideas at a faster pace in the
fast condition.
Measures
Participants responded to the same measures (of affect, subjec-
tively experienced thought speed, and inflated self-esteem) as in
the previous experiment
1 (see Appendix).
Participants’ tape recordings also were used as data. Three
judges (i.e., the experimenter, and two undergraduates uninformed
of participants’ condition and of our hypotheses) were provided
with a definition of grandiosity, drawn from clinical descriptions,
emphasizing the individual’s “inflated appraisals of his or her
self-worth, contacts, status power, or knowledge, as evidenced, for
example, by boasts, sensational plans, or claims of unlikely power,
status, knowledge, or contact”; at its most extreme, they were told,
the individual might “hear voices praising” him or her, or even see
or hear such praises from a higher power. The judges rated
participants using a 7-point scale (1  not at all grandiose,7
extremely grandiose); interrater reliability: Cronbach’s alpha 
.70. The tape recordings also were used to assess participants’
tendency toward pressured speech, defined by its nonstop nature
and difficulty to interrupt (DSM–IV, 1994; Goodwin & Jamison,
1990). We assessed whether participants spoke for longer than
their peers, and whether they continued speaking after the exper-
imenter’s signal (at 30 seconds) that it was time to stop.
Results and Discussion
Positive Affect
Participants in the fast thought-speed condition reported feeling
more positive affect than did participants in the slow thought-
1 For exploratory purposes, four other items also were included, testing
for feelings of friendliness, physical attractiveness, distractedness, and
interest in potentially sexual interaction (i.e., dating), all of which may be
symptoms of mania (see DSM–IV, 1994; Merck, 2004). Because these
items are not the focus of the current article, and were not pursued further,
we omit reporting them for the sake of brevity (but note that those in the
fast condition scored higher on the former two items, ps  .05, and no
different on the latter two).
601 THOUGHT SPEED AND MOODspeed condition (Ms  3.06 vs. 2.60, SDs  .72 and .69), F(1,
75)  6.90, p  .01. As can be seen in Table 2, participants in the
fast condition scored higher on the scale subcomponents of elation,
F(1, 75)  5.34, p  .02, energy, F(1, 75)  5.43, p  .02, and
creativity, F(1, 75)  6.29, p  .01, though they did not feel
significantly more powerful, F(1, 75)  1.59, p  .21.
The Role of Felt Thought Speed
We next examined whether participants’ felt speed of thought
mediated the effect of speed condition on positive affect. As
predicted, we found that participants in the fast condition per-
ceived themselves as thinking faster than did participants in the
slower condition (Ms  6.24 vs. 5.11, SDs  1.69 and 1.62), F(1,
75)  8.95, p  .004. We further found that, across conditions, the
faster participants felt they were thinking, the more positive affect
they reported, r(75)  .34, p  .002. We next found that, accord-
ing to the Sobel test, the effect of thought-speed condition on
positive affect tended to diminish when felt thought speed was
included in the model, z  1.94, p  .052. We also examined the
within-cell correlations between thought speed and mood, with a
particular interest in whether those who were in the slow condition
reported relatively more positive affect if they thought relatively
fast in that condition (see Spencer et al., 2005). The correlations
were: slow condition, r(34)  .33, p  .052, and fast condition,
r(40)  .25, p  .12.
For purposes of comparison, we also aimed to test an alternative
model whereby our manipulation of experimental condition might
have led participants to feel positively by influencing their actual
(rather than felt) thought speed. In this experiment, our proxy
measure of participants’ thought speed was their rate of speaking
while presenting their ideas. Although participants in the fast
condition spoke for longer than those in the comparison condition
(M  32.24 seconds vs. 30.11 seconds, SDs  3.35 and 2.11), F(1,
75)  8.50, p  .005, they did not generate words at a faster rate,
F(1, 75)  1, ns. That rate also did not correlate significantly with
positive affect, r(75)  .17, p  .14, and, accordingly, it did not
mediate the effect of experimental condition on positive affect, z 
.73, ns.
Finally, we tested one other alternative model, whereby partic-
ipants may have felt more positively in the fast condition because
they felt more successful. To test this possibility, we examined
whether the effect of experimental condition on positive affect was
mediated by participants’ feelings of success, as measured by the
performance subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale. Indeed,
scores on this measure were higher in the fast condition versus the
slow one (Ms  4.06 vs. 3.77, SDs  .57 and .71), F(1, 76) 
4.03, p  .048. Those scores also correlated with positive affect,
r(77)  .44, p  .0001. The Sobel test of mediation was margin-
ally significant, z  1.78, p  .07.
Additional Measures
Inflated self-esteem/grandiosity. As can be seen in Table 2,
participants in the fast condition reported higher state self-esteem
than their peers, F(1, 75)  7.88, p  .006. On the BIF, they
showed a marginal tendency to impute larger significance to their
actions than did their slow-thinking peers, F(1, 75)  3.70, p 
.06. Finally, our raters perceived fast-thinking participants to be
more grandiose than their slow-thinking peers, F(1, 75)  7.13,
p  .009.
Pressured speech. Participants in the fast condition not only
spoke for significantly longer than their peers (see above), but they
also proved more difficult to interrupt. A total of 71% of fast-
condition participants spoke past the experimenter’s interruption,
in comparison to 39% of their peers (SDs  .46 and .50), F(1,
75)  6.57, p  .01.
Negative affect. Participants showed no differences in nega-
tive affect between the faster and slower conditions (Ms  1.68 vs.
1.49, SDs  .76 and .59), F(1, 75)  1.49, p  .23.
Conclusions
The results of this experiment provide support for the hypothesis
that fast thinking elicits positive affect. Participants induced to
think fast about a problem, by virtue of the speed with which
various ideas about the problem were presented to them, displayed
more positive mood, and this effect emerged for subscales of
elation, energy, and feelings of creativity (but not for feelings of
power).
This experiment introduced an important control not found in
our first study. Specifically, participants were not asked to think of
their own ideas but instead were asked to read aloud an
experimenter-provided set of ideas. Yet, there is a remaining
question of experimental control raised by the present experiment.
In the study, participants in the fast condition were exposed to a
larger set of ideas than their peers. A useful next study, then, would
manipulate participants’ speed of thinking while exposing them to
the same quantity of thought content.
Experiment 3: Freedom to Plagiarize
In this experiment, participants listened to a tape recording of a
group of students brainstorming solutions to a problem. The ex-
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Experiment 2
Speed of thought condition
Measure Normal Fast
Elation
M (SD) 2.51 (0.85) 2.98
 (0.93)
High Energy
M (SD) 2.57 (0.69) 2.96
 (0.76)
Feelings of Power
M (SD) 2.73 (0.89) 2.98 (0.88)
Feelings of Creativity
M (SD) 2.64 (0.80) 3.13
 (0.93)
State Self-Esteem
M (SD) 3.42 (0.50) 3.71
 (0.43)
Behavior Identification Form (BIF)
M (SD) 12.86 (5.60) 15.26
† (5.40)
Raters’ Grandiosity Assessment
M (SD) 3.57 (0.97) 4.15
 (0.93)
Note. All measures were on 5-point scales, except for the BIF (25-point)
and Raters’ Grandiosity Assessment (7-point).
 Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .05.
† Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .10.
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they would be doing afterward. Specifically, participants in the fast
condition expected that they would then be suggesting solutions to
the problem to a group of people who had never before thought
about it, whereas participants in the slow condition expected that
they would be suggesting solutions to the same group they had just
heard. The motivation for this indirect manipulation of speed is
that participants in the condition where they are free to report the
ideas that they just heard (to a new group) may have the perception
of having many ideas in their heads and thus perceive that their
thoughts are moving quickly. In contrast, those in the other con-
dition may struggle to come up with ideas and thus perceive their
thoughts as moving slowly. Notably, the “slow thinker” might
actually think faster than the “fast thinker,” in terms of objective
thought speed—because the former actually must generate new
ideas. Thus, the predicted results in this study might reflect peo-
ple’s subjective experience of having many ideas in their head (i.e.,
their feeling of fast thinking) rather than necessarily reflecting the
actual rate of their idea production.
Method
Participants
A total of 66 undergraduates (30 female and 36 male) partici-
pated individually in exchange for course credit.
Procedure and Experimental Manipulation
After consenting to participate in an experiment on “brainstorm-
ing,” participants were told that they would be listening to a group
of students brainstorming about “the problem of ways to make one
year’s college tuition in a summer,” and that they then would make
their own recording of ideas about this problem. In the fast
condition, they were told that their recording would go “to a new
group of subjects who had never considered the problem, to spur
brainstorming in their group.” In the slow condition, they were told
that their recording would go “back to the group of brainstorming
subjects on the tape, to spur further brainstorming in their group.”
The experiment told participants to “listen carefully” to the tape
(either because they would later be “free to use whatever ideas you
hear on it” or because they would later need to “only introduce
ideas you didn’t hear on it”). After playing the tape (see
“Thought Stimulus”), she delivered an apparently casual remark
to solidify the experimental manipulation. In the fast condition,
she said, “By the way, it’s cool to use anything you heard on the
tape.” In the slow condition, she said, “By the way, I’d probably
stay away from anything they said on the tape.” Participants
were then told that they would have 1 minute to prepare and 1
minute to record their ideas. After the recording had proceeded
for 1 minute, the experimenter instructed them to stop, by
saying: “Okay—1 minute.” Finally, participants completed our
written measures.
Thought Stimulus
The tape that participants heard was created by the researchers
using the following procedure: The 63 ideas used in the previous
experiment were randomly divided into five sets of 12 to 13 ideas,
with one set given to each of five “actors” (i.e., three research
assistants and two graduate students). The actors were seated
around a tape recorder and told to pretend that they were brain-
storming about ways to make a year’s college tuition in a summer.
They were instructed to do so by offering ideas from their lists in
a natural-sounding way, with appropriate ad-libbing to make the
ideas sound like part of a genuine group discussion. Several
recordings were made, and the most convincing one (by group
consensus) was selected for this experiment.
Measures
Participants completed similar measures to those used in the
previous two experiments (see Appendix). Because the BIF was
not explicitly designed to assess grandiosity, we added a new
measure consisting of high-loading items from the State-Trait
Grandiosity Scale (Rosenthal, Hooley, & Steshenko, 2003). The
scale asks participants to rate how they are feeling “at the
present moment” with respect to 20 different items (e.g., glo-
rious, larger than life, omnipotent, charismatic, desired, impor-
tant;1 not at all,7 extremely). As in Experiment 2,
participants’ tape recordings were used to assess pressured
speech and observer-rated grandiosity.
Results and Discussion
Positive Affect
Participants in the condition designed to induce fast thinking
reported more positive affect than those in the condition de-
signed to induce slower thinking (Ms  2.90 vs. 2.58, SDs 
.50 and .58), F(1, 64)  6.34, p  .01. As shown in Table 3,
participants in the fast condition scored higher on the scale
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Experiment 3
Speed of thought condition
Measure Normal Fast
Elation
M (SD) 2.47 (0.83) 2.95
 (0.70)
High Energy
M (SD) 2.62 (0.63) 2.88
† (0.60)
Feelings of Power
M (SD) 2.73 (0.69) 3.10
 (0.71)
Feelings of Creativity
M (SD) 2.29 (0.81) 2.75
 (0.69)
State Self-Esteem
M (SD) 3.61 (0.50) 3.60 (0.42)
Behavior Identification Form (BIF)
M (SD) 14.63 (4.93) 14.94 (4.01)
Grandiosity Scale
M (SD) 3.12 (1.04) 3.64
 (0.85)
Raters’ Grandiosity Assessment
M (SD) 3.64 (0.77) 4.27
 (0.57)
Note. All measures were on 5-point scales, except for the BIF (25-point)
and Raters’ Grandiosity Assessment (7-point).
 Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .05.
† Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .10.
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F(1, 64)  4.78, p  .03, creativity, F(1, 64)  6.14, p  .02,
and marginally higher on the subcomponent energy, F(1, 64) 
2.90, p  .09.
The Role of Felt Thought Speed
We next sought to examine whether subjectively experienced
thought speed mediated the effect of speed condition on posi-
tive affect. As predicted, participants assigned to the fast con-
dition perceived their thoughts as being faster than did partic-
ipants in the slow condition (Ms  4.87 vs. 3.89, SDs  1.61
and 1.57), F(1, 64)  6.34, p  .01. Moreover, across condi-
tions, faster felt thought speed was correlated with more posi-
tive affect, r(64)  .34, p  .002. According to the Sobel test,
the effect of speed condition on positive affect decreased mar-
ginally when felt thought speed was included in the model, z 
1.75, p  .08. We also examined the within-cell correlations
between thought speed and mood, with a particular interest in
whether those who thought relatively fast in the slow condition
reported more positive affect than their slower-thinking peers in
that condition (see Spencer et al., 2005). The correlations were:
slow condition, r(33)  .37, p  .048, and fast condition,
r(29)  .24, p  .19.
For purposes of comparison, we again tested the alternate model
whereby our manipulation of experimental condition might have
influenced participants’ mood by virtue of its effects on their
actual (rather than felt) thought speed. Although participants in the
fast condition spoke for longer than participants in the slow con-
dition (Ms  57.06 seconds vs. 41.34 seconds, SDs  8.66 and
13.11), F(1, 64)  32.13, p  .0001, they did not generate words
at a faster rate, F(1, 64)  .52, ns. Their rate of word generation
was not significantly correlated with positive affect, r(64)  .20,
p  .11, and it did not mediate the effect of condition on this
measure, z  .66, ns.
Finally, we tested another alternative model whereby partici-
pants may have felt more positively in the fast condition because
they felt more successful at their task (which likely was easier in
the fast condition). We found that experimental condition did not
predict scores on our measure of perceived performance success
(i.e., the performance subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale),
F(1, 64)  .11, ns., thereby ruling out possible mediation (Sobel
test z  .33, ns.).
Additional Measures
Inflated self-esteem/grandiosity. Surprisingly, neither the
State Self-Esteem Scale nor the BIF revealed between-condition
differences (Fs  1). However, participants induced to think fast
scored higher than their peers on the State-Trait Grandiosity Scale,
F(1, 64)  4.95, p  .03. And, raters judged their taped speeches
to be more grandiose than those of their peers, F(1, 64)  13.57,
p  .0005 (see Table 3).
Pressured speech. Participants in the fast condition not only
spoke for longer than their peers (see above), but they also proved
more difficult to interrupt. A total of 42% of fast-condition par-
ticipants spoke past the experimenter’s interruption, in comparison
to 9% of slow-condition participants (SDs  .50 and .28), F(1,
64)  11.38, p  .001.
Negative affect. Participants again showed no differences in
negative affect between the fast and slow conditions (Ms  1.55
vs. 1.64, SDs  .55 and .66), F(1, 64)  .39, ns.
Conclusions
The results of this experiment augment the findings of our prior
studies by using an experimental manipulation that controls for
thought-content exposure across conditions. The results showed
that participants in the fast condition felt that they were thinking
faster than did their peers, and they displayed more positive mood.
Because this experiment manipulated thought speed in an indi-
rect fashion, we cannot be certain that our manipulation altered
participants’ actual speed of thought as opposed to only their
subjective thought speed. Additionally, although each of the fore-
going experiments has employed different manipulations of
thought speed, they all have focused on thoughts about the prob-
lem of how to make one year’s college tuition in a summer. This
is a difficult problem—the average income earned by a person
with some college education working for three months would
cover only about 22% of the participants’ tuition (based on U.S.
Census data; Day & Newburger, 2002). In the next experiment, we
sought to address these concerns about the thought content pre-
cipitated by our thought-speed manipulations. This experiment
sought to induce fast thinking, but about a less challenging subject.
Experiment 4: Task Ease
In this study, we hypothesized that even in the absence of
exciting and challenging thought material, participants would still
display positive affect—if their thoughts were relatively rapid.
Participants were led to think quickly by completing several dull
but easy word problems, whereas their peers completed slightly
more difficult versions of these problems.
Method
Participants
A total of 26 undergraduates (15 female and 11 male) who
described themselves as native English speakers participated indi-
vidually in exchange for course credit.
Procedure
Upon providing consent, participants received a packet with
instructions, a series of word generation tasks, and a packet of
dependent measures.
Thought Stimulus and Experimental Manipulation
Across the two experimental conditions, the word generation
task began with the following instructions: “The next few pages
contain several prompts. Below each prompt, list words that
come to your mind in response to that prompt. Please fill in all
of the numbered spaces. Do not include multiple forms of the
same word.” The number of spaces provided for each prompt was
the same across conditions, but the prompts were designed to be
more quickly solved in the fast condition than in the slow condition
so that the former would induce faster thinking. The fast condition
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brackets (and the number of prompts for each problem in paren-
theses): Five letter words [Eight letter words] (25); Words rhyming
with “mite” [Words rhyming with “speck”] (7); Words ending
with -ch [Words ending with -rch] (12); Two syllable words [Four
syllable words] (25); Words starting with pa- [Words starting with
pas-] (10); Words ending with the letter k [Words starting with the
letter k] (20).
Measures
Participants completed our measure of thought speed, as well as
the PANAS positive affect scale, the State Self-Esteem Scale, and
the State-Trait Grandiosity Scale. They did not complete a measure
of negative affect since our first three experiments found no
evidence for effects involving it.
Results and Discussion
Positive Affect
Participants in the condition designed to induce fast thinking re-
ported more positive affect than did those in the condition designed to
induce slower thinking (Ms  3.15 vs. 2.51, SDs  .58 and .82), F(1,
24)  5.22, p  .03. As shown in Table 4, participants in the fast
condition tended to score higher on the various subcomponents of
positive affect. Specifically, they were more likely to report feeling
elated, F(1, 24)  4.89, p  .04, and feeling creative, F(1, 24) 
6.66, p  .02, and marginally more likely to report feeling powerful,
F(1, 24)  3.97, p  .06. They did not report feeling significantly
more energetic (though the means were in that direction), F(1, 24) 
1.23, p  .28.
The Role of Felt Thought Speed
We next investigated whether felt thought speed mediated the
effect of experimental condition on positive affect. We found that
participants in the fast condition perceived themselves as thinking
faster than did participants in the slow condition (Ms  5.46 vs.
3.31, SDs  1.81 and 1.84), F(1, 24)  9.05, p  .006. Across
conditions, the faster participants felt they were thinking, the more
positive affect they reported, r(24)  .70, p  .0001. Finally, the
Sobel test revealed that the effect of experimental condition on
positive affect was diminished when the effects of felt thought
speed were included in the model, z  2.35, p  .02. We also
examined the within-cell correlations between thought speed and
mood, with a particular interest in whether those in the slow
condition would report relatively more positive affect if they
thought relatively fast in that condition (see Spencer et al., 2005).
The correlations were: slow condition, r(11)  .76, p  .002, and
fast condition, r(11)  .42, p  .15.
In addition to experiencing different thought speed depending
on experimental condition, participants also performed somewhat
differently. Those in the fast condition completed all 99 items
(SD  0), whereas those in the slow condition on average com-
pleted 91.15 (SD  12.38), F(1, 24)  5.22, p  .03. Thus, it is
worth considering an alternative model whereby differences in
objective success could have accounted for our results. Not sur-
prisingly, task success was correlated with positive affect, r(24) 
.42, p  .03. However, the Sobel test revealed that task success did
not mediate the effect of speed condition on positive affect, z 
1.23, p  .22.
We also tested whether subjective feelings about performance
success could have mediated the effect of experimental condition,
particularly because participants were likely aware of their task suc-
cess (i.e., of whether or not they left questions unanswered). We found
that experimental condition did not predict scores on our measure of
perceived performance success (i.e., the performance subscale of the
State Self-Esteem Scale), F(1, 24)  .15, ns., thereby ruling out
possible mediation (Sobel test z  1.19, p  .23).
Additional Measures
Participants in the fast condition showed higher state self-
esteem than their peers, F(1, 24)  4.38, p  .047, and more
grandiosity (on the State-Trait Grandiosity Scale), F(1, 24)  4.71,
p  .04 (see Table 4).
Conclusions
This experiment extended the results of our previous experi-
ments to a new domain of thinking. Participants were led to think
about mundane word problems rather than ambitious financial
pursuits. The fact that positive affect was induced by fast thinking
about such dull topics as “words rhyming with mite,”
2 makes clear
that the speed of thought can elicit good feelings even if the
content of that thought would be unlikely to.
There is one question, however, that has not been explicitly
addressed in our experiments thus far. That question is whether
fast thinking lifts positive mood, or whether slow thinking instead
depresses it. One way to consider this question is to look back at
our experimental manipulations. In Experiments 1 through 4,
2 To ensure that this task was perceived as dull, a separate sample of
undergraduates (N  22) was asked to complete it, and then to “rate how
dull versus exciting” it was (1  very dull,9 very exciting). The modal
response wasa2o nt h escale, and the mean response fell significantly on
the “dull” side of the midpoint (M  3.77), t(21)  3.20, p  .004.
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Experiment 4
Speed of thought condition
Measure Normal Fast
Elation
M (SD) 2.44 (1.04) 3.21
 (0.70)
High Energy
M (SD) 2.88 (0.89) 3.22 (0.65)
Feelings of Power
M (SD) 2.25 (0.72) 2.84
† (0.81)
Feelings of Creativity
M (SD) 2.36 (1.09) 3.31
 (0.75)
State Self-Esteem
M (SD) 2.38 (0.92) 3.15
 (0.85)
Grandiosity Scale
M (SD) 2.02 (0.62) 2.64
 (0.81)
Note. All measures were on 5-point scales.
 Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .05.
† Indicates difference between the two thought-speed conditions at p  .10.
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problems at a rapid rate—for example, by suggesting ideas even
if they were useless (Experiment 1), or by processing ideas at an
unusually fast pace (Experiment 2), whereas their peers were
led to think in ways that might reflect a more typical thought
pace. For example, participants in the fast condition of Exper-
iment 2 were induced to process 63 ideas in 2 minutes, whereas
their peers processed seven ideas in that period; the former
group was led to think unusually rapidly, but the latter group
still was required to process more ideas per unit time than they
could have generated themselves (as made clear by Experiment
1, in which even in the fast condition participants generated
only about 1.5 ideas per minute).
Another way to address this question, though, is to collect
additional data designed to more specifically address it. Our final
two experiments do that, using two different approaches. In Ex-
periment 5, we aim to employ a clear set of speed conditions—fast,
slow, and normal—to see whether effects on positive mood can be
attributed to the fast-speed condition relative to the normal-speed
condition. In Experiment 6, we aim to examine whether clearly
fast (and slow) conditions produce changes in positive affect
relative to baseline. In this latter experiment, our inductions of
thought speed are based on a paradigm developed by Pronin and
Wegner (2006) in which participants are led to read at a speed that
is approximately twice as fast as normal (or twice as slow). In both
experiments, our principal prediction is that fast thinking will
induce positive mood, though we also aim to explore whether slow
thinking decreases it.
Experiment 5: Watching in Fast Forward
Participants watched a clip from the 1950s TV show I Love Lucy
(Arnaz, 1951). It was played silently at its normal speed, or at a
fast or slow speed. Participants narrated it as they watched. We
predicted that those watching the fast clip would perceive their
thoughts as more rapid than those in the normal condition and that
they would report more positive affect. We did not have specific
predictions about the slow versus normal conditions.
Method
Participants
Seventy-three undergraduates (45 female and 28 male) partici-
pated individually for course credit.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were seated at a
computer monitor and told they were “about to see a clip of the
1950s TV show I Love Lucy, starring Lucille Ball and Desi
Arnaz.” They were told that the clip was from an episode called
“Job Switching” (Carroll, Oppenheimer, & Pugh, 1952). The ex-
perimenter then played the clip, without sound. Participants were
instructed to narrate aloud what they saw during the clip. Finally,
they completed our dependent measures.
Thought Stimuli and Experimental Manipulation
In the video clip of I Love Lucy, Lucy and her neighbor Ethel
think that earning money is much easier than doing housework
whereas their husbands Ricky and Fred think the opposite. Thus,
the men try doing the housework while the women try working a
job at the candy factory. In the episode Ricky prepares breakfast
for Lucy, Lucy and Ethel visit the employment office, Lucy and
Ethel try working at the candy factory, Ricky and Fred attempt
cooking dinner for their wives, Ricky tries to iron a pair of
stockings, and, finally, all four come to the consensus that they
should remain in their respective roles.
In all three conditions, participants saw a 3-min clip. In the
fast condition, they saw the entire 24-min episode (excluding
opening and closing credits), at eight times its normal speed. In
the normal condition, they saw a 3-min clip at its regular speed
that included the scene in which Ricky, wearing an apron, tries
to iron a pair of stockings. In the slow condition, they saw a
portion of that 3-min segment, at 70% of its regular speed. In
the fast and slow conditions, Apple Final Cut Pro software was
used to alter the speed of the episode while maintaining a
smooth (i.e., not choppy or visibly distorted) presentation; the
speeds that were selected were chosen for being noticeably fast
(or slow) without affecting picture quality.
Measures
Participants responded to the PANAS scales for both positive
and negative affect. As with our past experiments, they also
reported their subjectively experienced thought speed. To assess
whether they understood the clip they were shown, participants
were asked to write a few sentences describing what happened in
the clip (all participants did so correctly).
Results and Discussion
Positive Affect
Consistent with our expectations, the thought-speed manip-
ulation influenced participants’ feelings of positive affect, F(2,
70)  3.97, p  .02. More specifically, it induced participants
in the fast condition to feel more positive affect than partici-
pants in the normal condition (Ms  2.43 vs. 1.88, SDs  .69
and .63), F(1, 47)  8.53, p  .005. It did not lead participants
in the slow condition (M  2.18, SD  .73) to feel significantly
more or less positive affect than those in the normal condition,
F(1, 47)  2.35, p  .13, or the fast condition, F(1, 46)  1.50,
p  .23.
The Role of Felt Thought Speed
Our experimental manipulation succeeded in producing a
difference between conditions in felt thought speed, F(2, 70) 
9.54, p  .0002. Participants in the fast condition perceived
themselves as thinking faster than did participants in the normal
condition (Ms  5.58 vs. 4.12, SDs  1.82 and 1.30), F(1,
47)  10.58, p  .002. Those in the slow condition did not
perceive themselves as thinking more slowly (M  3.71, SD 
1.55) than did their normal-condition peers, F(1, 47)  1.02,
p  .32.
606 PRONIN, JACOBS, AND WEGNERWe next examined whether felt thought speed mediated the effect
of experimental condition on positive affect. Across conditions the
faster participants felt they were thinking, the more positive affect
they felt, r(71)  .35, p  .002. Second, results of the Sobel test
revealed that the effect of experimental condition on positive affect
was diminished when the effects of perceived thought speed were
included in the model, z  2.37, p  .02. We also examined the
within-cell correlations between thought speed and positive mood,
with a particular interest in whether those who were not in the fast
condition would also report relatively more positive affect if they
thought relatively fast in those conditions. The correlations were: slow
condition, r(22) .35, p.09, normal condition, r(23) .02, ns, and
fast condition, r(22)  .45, p  .03.
Additional Measure
Similar to the results of our past experiments, this experiment
again found no significant effects of thought-speed condition on
negative affect (Mfast  1.36, Mnormal  1.28, Mslow  1.48;
SDs  .39, .29, and .53), F(2, 70)  1.48, p  .24.
Conclusions
These results provide further evidence of the psychological
effects of fast thinking. They also address the question of whether
thought-speed effects on positive affect can be attributed to effects
of fast versus normal thinking (rather than to effects of slow versus
normal thinking). In this experiment, a fast-speed manipulation
induced more positive mood than a normal-speed manipulation. A
slow-speed manipulation had no significant effects. Because the
slow-speed manipulation did not significantly reduce reported
thought speed in this study, however, it might be that slowed speed
could have effects but that we simply were not successful in
manipulating it. It also is possible that any alteration of thought
speed from its normal status is perceived as pleasing and elicits
positive affect. Our next experiment aimed to address this question, by
measuring changes in participants’ mood from before to after a
manipulation of thought speed.
Experiment 6: Reading Aloud, Before and After
In this study, we sought to influence positive affect using a
manipulation of reading speed (Pronin & Wegner, 2006). Partici-
pants were asked to read aloud sentences on their computer screen
at a slow or fast rate. We predicted that participants’ mood would
be more positive after fast reading. We did not have specific
predictions about the slow speed condition.
Method
Participants
A total of 33 undergraduates (20 female and 13 male) partici-
pated individually in exchange for course credit.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants re-
sponded to the positive and negative affect scales of the PANAS.
Afterward they completed an unrelated survey (concerning per-
ceptions of equity) as filler, and then were informed about their
experimental task. They were told that, in the study, they would be
asked to “read words on the computer screen as they appear.” They
were further told that it was “important for the experiment that
you’re reading at all times,” and that to ensure that they would be
tape-recorded as they read aloud. Participants then began the
reading task (see below). After the experimenter confirmed that
each participant was reading aloud, she left the room until the
participant was finished reading. She then returned and asked the
participant to complete the dependent measures.
Thought Stimuli and Experimental Manipulation
The text that participants read described a typical day in the life
of a female college student, written from that student’s perspec-
tive. It started with the text: “My alarm went off this morning at
eight o’clock. I got out of bed and turned it off. I went to the
bathroom to brush my teeth and take a shower.” It then described
various activities in the student’s day, including going to classes,
having meals, studying at the library, and chatting with friends.
The text was presented in Arial 40-point font on participants’
computer monitor such that it appeared one letter at a time until it
extended across the full width of the computer monitor. Once each
line of text (approximately 37 characters including spaces) ap-
peared in full, it then disappeared and the next line appeared in the
same fashion. The entire story was 86 lines. In the fast condition,
the text appeared at a speed of 40 milliseconds per letter (with an
additional 320 milliseconds before the next slide), and in the slow
condition it appeared at 170 milliseconds per letter (with an
additional 4,000 milliseconds between slides). These speeds were
selected based on research (Pronin & Wegner, 2006) showing that
they were, respectively, about twice as fast and twice as slow as
the normal reading speed for our undergraduate population.
Measures
Participants completed the positive and negative affect scales of
the PANAS both before and after the reading manipulation. The
items in the scale were randomly arranged in different orders for
the pre- versus postversions. As in previous studies, participants
were asked to rate their subjective thought speed as they “read the
statements on the computer screen” (1  very slow,9 very fast).
As a measure of subjective fluency, they also were asked: “How
easy or difficult did it feel to read the statements on the computer
screen?” (1  very difficult,9 very easy). Participants also
completed the State Self-Esteem Scale.
Results and Discussion
Affect Changes From Baseline
The primary prediction in this study concerned changes in
positive affect from before to after the manipulation of thought
speed. Consistent with our predictions, participants reported more
positive affect after participating in the fast condition than they did
at baseline (Ms  4.59 vs. 3.63, SDs  1.52 and 1.30). This
difference was significant according to a repeated measures
ANOVA, F(1, 16)  13.14, p  .002. The reverse was true for
participants in the slow condition: They reported less positive
affect after participating in the slow condition than they did at
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7.17, p  .02. The experience of reading fast inflated positive
affect, whereas the experience of reading slow deflated it.
We also examined potential effects of the speed manipulation on
negative affect. Participants in the fast condition showed no dif-
ference in negative affect after versus before the manipulation
(Ms  2.34 vs. 2.52, SDs  1.12 and 1.57), F(1, 16)  .30, ns.
Those in the slow condition reported marginally less negative
affect after the manipulation than before it (Ms  1.51 vs. 1.78,
SDs  .61 and .82), F(1, 15)  4.23, p  .06.
Differences Between Conditions
Positive affect. We next sought to ensure that the results of our
previous experiments, involving differences between speed condi-
tions, were replicated in this experiment. First, we found that
participants in the fast condition reported more positive affect than
participants in the slow condition, after controlling for chance
differences in baseline affect (Msadjusted  4.89 vs. 3.39), F(1,
30)  17.10, p  .0003.
Roles of felt thought speed, subjective fluency. As in previous
studies, participants in the fast condition reported thinking faster
than their slow condition peers (Ms  6.59 vs. 3.89, SDs  1.46
and 1.71), F(1, 31)  24.16, p  .0001. Across conditions, the
faster participants felt they were thinking, the more likely they
were to report increased positive affect relative to baseline,
r(31)  .63, p  .0001. According to the Sobel test, the effect of
thought-speed condition on positive affect was partially mediated
by participants’ subjectively felt thought speed, z  1.96, p 
.050. We also examined the within-cell correlations between
thought speed and mood, with a particular interest in whether those
who were in the slow condition also reported relatively more positive
affect if they thought relatively fast in that condition. The correlations
were: slow condition, r(14)  .47, p  .07, and fast condition,
r(15)  .29, p  .26.
We also looked at whether participants’ feelings of ease versus
difficulty during the reading task mediated the effects of speed
condition on positive affect. Participants did not show a significant
tendency to feel that fast reading was easier than slow reading
(respective Ms  5.59 vs. 6.69, SDs  1.94 and 2.15), F(1, 31) 
2.38, p  .13. Feelings of ease versus difficulty were not corre-
lated with increased positive affect relative to baseline, r(31) 
.02, ns.
We next examined whether participants’ greater positive affect
in the fast condition was mediated by their having felt more
successful about their performance in that condition. There was no
evidence for this, as participants did not report feeling more
successful in that condition (indeed, they reported feeling margin-
ally less successful; Ms  3.72 vs. 4.09, SDs  .64 and .54; F(1,
31)  3.10, p  .09).
Additional measures. Interestingly, participants reported
lower state self-esteem in the fast condition than in the slow
condition (Ms  3.50 vs. 3.87, both SDs  .50), F(1, 31)  4.69,
p  .04. They also showed a marginal tendency to report more
negative affect in that condition, after controlling for chance dif-
ferences in baseline affect (Msadjusted  2.19 vs. 1.68), F(1, 30) 
3.57, p  .07.
Conclusions
This experiment further provides evidence supporting our hy-
pothesis that thought speed influences positive affect. Participants
reported more positive mood after our fast-thinking manipulation
than before it, and they reported less positive mood after our
slow-thinking manipulation than before it. These results thus sug-
gest that effects of thought speed on mood can involve both the
joy-enhancing effects of fast thinking as well as the joy-dampening
effects of slow thinking.
The present study also provides further support for the partially
mediating effects of subjectively experienced thought speed on mood.
We also aimed to examine the mediating impact of subjectively
experienced ease, but failed to find significant effects. This could be
in part attributable to the wording of our question, because some
participants in the slow condition may have felt that saying their task
felt “difficult” would be strange given that they were provided with
ample time for doing it (whereas those in the fast condition might
have felt that their task was technically difficult, even if it felt easy,
because of the rapid processing that it required). Further research is
needed to address the role of fluency in thought speed effects.
General Discussion
These experiments suggest that situational manipulations can
lead people to experience changes in thought speed. Such manip-
ulations of thought speed influence positive affect. The manipula-
tions used in these experiments included instructions to brainstorm
freely, exposure to multiple ideas, encouragement to plagiarize
others’ ideas, performance of easy cognitive tasks, narration of a
video played at high speed, and reading at a rapid pace. These
manipulations elicited thoughts ranging in content from ideas for
how to make large sums of money, to solutions for simple words
problems. By using varied methods for testing the hypothesis that
thought speed influences mood, our experiments suggest that this
effect does not depend on a single type of thought content or
speed-induction procedure. Across six manipulations, participants
in the condition designed to induce relatively faster thinking not
only reported thinking faster than their peers but also reported
more positive affect. The results of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest
that these between-condition differences in positive mood are at
least partially because of the joy-enhancing effects of fast thinking.
Across the experiments presented in this article, we report
evidence that effects of thought speed on positive affect are par-
tially mediated by participants’ subjective experience of that
speed. This suggests that the subjective experience of thought
speed may play a role in its positive mood effects. Such an account
would be consistent with the idea (discussed in the introduction)
that people sometimes reflect on their thinking, and those reflec-
tions can elicit different feelings depending on the lay theories
people possess (e.g., Schwarz, 2005). However, although this
mediational evidence is consistent across studies, the evidence
indicates fairly weak (and sometimes only marginally significant)
mediation. This suggests that though the subjective experience of
thought speed may contribute to its positive mood effects, those
effects may not be fully accounted for by the metacognitive
experience of thought speed. Theoretically, it could be that effects
of thought speed are also driven by less reflective processes, such
as those mentioned in the introduction of this article (e.g., dopa-
mine activation, processing speed).
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processes that account for thought speed effects. In the present re-
search, we were able to begin an examination of possible underpin-
nings. Apart from the subjective experience of thought speed, another
possibility that we explored (in Experiments 1–3) involved partici-
pants’ rate of verbal thought production. We found some evidence
that participants verbalized thoughts at a faster pace in the fast
conditions, but we did not find evidence that those differences in
pace mediated effects of experimental condition on positive mood.
However, these analyses do not rule out the possibility that
objective thought rate contributes to our effects, since our
measures were unlikely to have directly tapped into that rate.
Another possible account for our results involves whether in-
dividuals may have experienced more positive mood in the fast
conditions because they were more successful (or perceived
themselves to be more successful) in those conditions. In five of
our six experiments, we were able to examine measures of either
real or perceived success (or both), and we found no evidence to
support this account. That is, effects of thought speed condition
were never mediated by participants’ actual success at the task nor
by their perceptions about their performance. For example, fast-
thinking participants in Experiment 1 actually saw their ideas as
being of overall worse quality—and coders shared that percep-
tion—and neither self-perceived idea quality nor coders’ assess-
ments of idea quality mediated the observed effects.
The focus of these experiments has been on the effects of
thought speed on positive mood, and in several of our experiments
we looked at positive mood more closely by examining subcom-
ponents of it. These involved feelings of elation, increased energy,
creativity and power. Across the four experiments in which we
examined these subcomponents, we found evidence for effects of
experimental condition on feelings of elation and of creativity. We
found significant effects in two of the four experiments for energy
(Experiments 1 and 2) and power (Experiments 1 and 3), suggest-
ing the possibility that effects on these two subcomponents may be
less strong (or more context-dependent) than effects on the others.
Of course, these various measures of positive affect are highly
interrelated, and it also may be that effects of thought speed induce
a more “generic” positive effect on mood, and one that may not be
importantly differentiated according to these subcomponents.
Our studies also examined effects of fast thinking on two other
responses: inflated self-esteem/grandiosity, and pressured speech.
Our studies provided mixed evidence for effects of thought speed
on a standard measure of state self-esteem (three of five experi-
ments found supportive evidence, one found the reverse). They
provided more consistent evidence on measures designed to assess
clinical grandiosity (two of two experiments found supportive
evidence) and involving coders’ assessments of grandiosity (two
of two experiments found supportive evidence). These collective
results may reflect a specific effect of fast thinking on proneness to
inflated self-assessment, but they also may reflect a proneness to
endorse positive features more generally after fast thinking (e.g.,
including those features in our positive affect measure). In the case
of our measure of pressured speech, which involved whether
participants spoke past an experimenter’s interruption, both studies
that measured it found evidence for it. The results on this measure
and on the measures of grandiosity suggest that effects of fast
thinking may extend beyond positive mood to responses involving
self-assessment (e.g., grandiosity) and behavior (e.g., speech). In
further research it will be useful to examine other possible re-
sponses elicited by increased thought speed, such as responses
involving self-regulation (e.g., goal setting, see Johnson & Carver,
2006).
Finally, it is worth noting that our experiments did not find
effects of thought speed on negative mood (with the exception of
some marginal effects in our final experiment). This result is
consistent with some past research and theory. Work on fluency,
for example, has reported effects on positive but not negative
mood (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). From the perspective of
the inspiration of this work, that is, cases of clinical mania, those
cases often involve elevations in positive mood, but not necessarily
decreases in negative mood. Indeed, mania often is accompanied
by feelings of hostility or anger (e.g., DSM–IV, 1994). However, it
also is possible that effects of thought speed on negative mood are
present and are simply more difficult to detect than effects on
positive mood, for example because of the relatively low levels of
negative mood reported by our participants.
Mania and Potential Clinical Implications
This research explores a new concept in the field of social psy-
chology: that is, fast thinking. Although this concept is inspired by the
psychiatric literature on “racing thoughts” and mania, the current
research constitutes the first systematic attempt to conduct a series of
experiments manipulating this cognitive process, and examining the
psychological consequences of such manipulation. Of course, our
results do not come close to approximating the clinical experience of
a manic state. However, it is possible that they may be relevant to that
state, and we now explore that possibility further.
In the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry, mania and
bipolar disorder (“manic-depression”) are typically conceptualized
in terms of the mood states associated with them. Major psychi-
atric disorders are generally categorized as affective disorders,
such as mania, or thought disorders, such as schizophrenia. How-
ever, the present results suggest exploring the possibility that
mania may, at least sometimes, begin with racing thoughts rather
than positive mood. This hypothesis is consistent with the results
of other research studies which suggest that positive mood is not
the first symptom to appear before a manic episode begins in
earnest (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Miklowitz & Johnson, 2006). In fact,
several studies have found that manic patients identify racing
thoughts as one of the most common early signs (along with sleep
disturbance) that precede a full manic episode (Lam & Wong,
2005; Molnar, Feeney, & Fava, 1998; Smith & Tarrier, 1992).
Apart from issues of etiology, these findings may hold relevance to
the treatment of mania and depression. In an experiment with a
normal college population, Pronin and Wegner (2006) found that
speeded thinking even of depressive thoughts yielded positive affect.
In combination with the present experiments, these findings suggest
that manipulations of thought speed may hold promise as one com-
ponent of treatment for the mood symptoms of affective disorders.
Thought speed might be manipulated, perhaps using acute manipula-
tions of the sort described here, to alleviate unwanted mood symp-
toms. Indeed, some evidence from clinical patients provides support
for this possibility. Teasdale and Rezin (1978) instructed depressed
participants to repeat aloud one of four letters of the alphabet (A, B,
C, or D) presented in random order every 1, 2, or 4 seconds. They
609 THOUGHT SPEED AND MOODfound that those participants required to repeat the letters at the fastest
rate experienced the most reduction in depressed mood. Over the past
several decades, we have observed a cognitive revolution in the
treatment of mental illness. This revolution has in large part been
inspired by Aaron Beck’s pioneering idea that mental illness, partic-
ularly depression and anxiety, can be perpetuated by the contents of
our cognition, involving “maladaptive schemata, automatic thoughts,
and biased interpretations” (Clark & Beck, 1989, p. 382; also Abram-
son, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 1976; Beck & Emery, 1985).
The present research suggests the possibility that it may not only
be the contents of our cognition that can be intervened with to improve
the symptoms of mental illness, but also the speed of that cognition.
On a related note, these findings also provide a novel hypothesis
about the mechanisms underlying the mood-enhancing effects of
certain everyday activities such as drinking coffee, and engaging in
aerobic exercise. These activities are proven mood lifters, and they
have been shown to induce faster thinking. The present findings
suggest the possibility, one that requires further research, that the
positive effects of some of these experiences may at times occur by
way of their impact on thought speed. These findings suggest that
experiences that can succeed in making us think fast may have
desirable consequences for affect (and, perhaps, for energy and
self-confidence). In a world where we often could use an extra
boost to our mood, simple manipulations of thought speed may
have valuable practical importance.
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611 THOUGHT SPEED AND MOODAppendix
Table of Measures Used in Each Experiment, in Their Order of Presentation
Experiment Measures
Experiment 1: Brainstorming 1. Felt thought speed
2. Positive and Negative Affect (modified PANAS
)
3. State Self-Esteem scale
4. Behavior Identification Form
5. Self-rating of “good ideas” (from participant notes
†)
6. Coders’ ratings of idea quality (from participant notes)
Experiment 2: Idea exposure 1. Felt thought speed
2. Positive and Negative Affect (modified PANAS)
3. New items: friendly, attractive, dating, distracted
4. State Self-Esteem Scale
5. Behavior Identification Form
6. Pressured speech (from participant recording)
7. Coded grandiosity (from participant recording)
Experiment 3: Plagiarism 1. Felt thought speed
2. Positive and negative affect (modified PANAS)
3. State Self-Esteem scale
4. Behavior Identification Form
5. State-Trait Grandiosity scale
6. Pressured speech (from participant recording)
7. Coded grandiosity (from participant recording)
Experiment 4: Task ease 1. Felt thought speed
2. Positive Affect (modified PANAS)
3. State-Trait Grandiosity scale
4. State Self-Esteem scale
Experiment 5: Watching in fast forward 1. Felt thought speed
2. Positive and Negative Affect (PANAS)
3. Written description of clip
Experiment 6: Reading aloud 1. Positive and Negative Affect (PANAS; at pretest)
2. Felt thought speed
3. Felt ease versus difficulty
4. Positive and Negative Affect (PANAS; at posttest)
5. State Self-Esteem scale
 The modified PANAS for assessing positive affect included additional items (happy, creative, powerful, tired [reverse-
scored], insightful), and for negative affect it included a subset of items (distressed, hostile, jittery, irritable).
† Items indicating “from participant notes” (or “recording”) derive from analysis of participants’ hand-written notes (or
taped speech) and thus were not assessed in the questionnaire packet.
Received April 4, 2007
Revision received April 10, 2008
Accepted June 23, 2008 
612 PRONIN, JACOBS, AND WEGNER